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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as the UK's leader, he was the fifth UK leader to occupy the role over a six-year span.

Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is unfolding in France, now on its fifth prime minister in 24 months – three of them in the last ten months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, abandoning Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in return for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his administration's continuation.

But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not witnessed for decades – perhaps not since the start of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.

Governing Without a Majority

Key background: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a hung parliament split into three warring blocs – left, far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be largely unchanged from before – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the next day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job virtually unworkable.

A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it mildly, not without complications.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to prevent a vote. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those votes, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by some miracle, the divided parliament musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his successor would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the future president will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

In the end, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that cultural shift will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and actively discourages – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”